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Applying I.R.C. Section 1033 to
Involuntary Conversions of
Thoroughbred Horses
By BRUCE M. REYNOLDS*
INTRODUCTION
Generally a taxpayer is taxed on income when realized.I The
tax is owed at the time the taxpayer receives cash or property
from the disposition of an asset.2 However, the Internal Revenue
Code (Code) provides that gain need not be recognized on the
disposal of certain property in certain circumstances.
The non-recognition of gain under section 1031 of the Code
when one horse is disposed of in a "like-kind exchange" for
another horse was explored by this author in a prior Article, Tax-
Free Exchanges of Interests in Thoroughbred Horses .3 This Arti-
cle continues the examination of non-recognition provisions in re-
lation to the equine industry by examining the application of sec-
tion 1033 relating to involuntary conversions of horses.
Section 1033 provides that no gain will be recognized when
property is "involuntarily converted" if the proceeds received by
the taxpayer upon the conversion of the property are reinvested
in similar or related property.4 For example, if a taxpayer re-
ceives insurance proceeds upon the death of a broodmare killed
by lightning and the proceeds are reinvested in another brood-
mare of equal value, no gain would be recognized and no tax
would be immediately due. Non-recognition of gain from invol-
Member of the Lexington, Kentucky, firm of Stites & Harbison. B.A. 1968, J.D.
1970, University of Kentucky; LL.M. 1974, Georgetown University.
1 See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-1(a) (1969). "Gross income includes income realized in any
form, whether in money, property or services. Income may be realized, therefore, in the
form of services, meals, accommodations, stock, or other property, as well as in cash." Id.
(emphasis added).
2 See generally R. SOMMERFELD, H. ANDERSON & H. BROCK, AN INTRODUCrION TO
TAxATION §§ 5-8 to 5-9 (1977). The mere appreciation in value of an asset does not give
rise to tax liability. Gain will be recognized only on exchange or sale. Id.
3 Reynolds, 59 TAXES 547 (1981).
4 I.R.C. § 1033(a)(2)(A) (1976, Supp. III 1979 & Supp. IV 1980). Nor will gain be
recognized if the taxpayer uses proceeds to purchase stock in the acquisition or control of a
corporation owning similar or related property. See id.
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untarily conversion is particularly significant to thoroughbred
horse owners because thoroughbred horses have recently appre-
ciated tremendously in value. This appreciation, and the result-
ing tax consequences, require a taxpayer to consider the applica-
tion of section 1033 upon the receipt of insurance proceeds from
the involuntary conversion of the thoroughbred if the taxpayer
plans to reinvest in another thoroughbred.
In determining whether to take advantage of the non-recog-
nition provision, a horse owner must carefully consider many
factors. One of the most important is cost recovery (depreci-
ation). In the past, depreciation on horses was attractive due to
horses' relatively short useful lives and their qualification for ac-
celerated depreciation.5 The depreciation of horses, like that of
other property, is affected by the new Accelerated Cost Recovery
System (ACRS) which was added to the Code in 1981.6 Under
ACRS, the tax benefits from the cost recovery of an investment in
horses have become even more attractive in many instances.
These tax benefits are important in analyzing the non-recogni-
tion provisions of the Code because the new horse takes the tax
basis of the horse it has replaced when section 1033 applies to the
disposition and replacement of horses. 7 Therefore, the taxpayer
must decide if the immediate avoidance under section 1033 of
taxable gain on the disposition, which may be largely taxed at
capital gains rates,8 is worth foregoing future cost recovery de-
5 Under the law as it existed before the effective date of the Economic Recovery Act
of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981), if the original use of a horse began with a
taxpayer and the horse had a useful life of three years or more, it qualified for the double
declining balance method of depreciation. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.167(b)-2 (1960).
This normally would have only included a yearling or a weanling which had no prior use.
If the horse had been previously used, the 150% declining balance method was the most
rapid available method. See generally id. A horse used for racing was considered used
property if it was later acquired and used for breeding purposes. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(c)-
1(a)(2) (1960). Industry useful life guidelines were generally accepted for depreciation
purposes and they set a maximum useful life of a thoroughbred participating in racing as
six years (a one-year-old gelding) and a maximum useful life of ten years for breeding stock
(a three-year-old stallion or broodmare). See generally, Presentation by Rex B. Potter,
Seminar: Accounting and Taxation in the Horse Industry 4-6 (Oct. 6,1981).
6 See I.R.C. § 168 (West Supp. 1982).
7 See I.R.C. § 1033(b) (1976, Supp. 1111979 & Supp. IV 1980).
8 Thoroughbreds held for sporting or breeding purposes for 24 months will be
treated as § 1231 property and therefore be subject, in part, to capital gains rates on dispo-
sition. Section 1245 also applies to dispositions and depreciation which may be recaptured.
See I.R.C. § 1245(b)(4) (1976).
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ductions from ordinary income. 9
Other factors the taxpayer must consider in deciding whether
to use section 1033 include the holding period of the horse to be
disposed of, the cost recovery period of the thoroughbreds, the
amount of depreciation recapture and the tax bracket of the tax-
payer for current and future years. Clearly, the greater the after-
tax value of the cost recovery deductions in the years immediate-
ly following the disposition, the easier it is to decide to forego the
use of the non-recognition provisions.
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
Section 1033 of the Code provides rules regarding non-recog-
nition of gain upon the involuntary conversion of property.10 The
non-recognition treatment allowed by this section is elective so
that a taxpayer has the option of choosing whether or not to
recognize gain. Section 1033 applies when property is involuntar-
ily converted as the result of destruction (in whole or in part),
theft, seizure or condemnation. 1 Livestock (including horses) de-
stroyed or sold because of disease are considered involuntarily
converted. 2 When property is involuntarily converted, no gain
9 These considerations are illustrated by the following example:
A, a 50% taxpayer, owned a five-year-old broodmare, Bluebell, which was pur-
chased for $100,000, had a current basis of $40,000 and was insured for $500,000. Blue-
bell was killed by lightning, and A collected the full insurance proceeds. A used the pro-
ceeds to purchase another five-year-old broodmare, Snowdrop, which will be considered
five-year property under the Accelerated Cost Recovery System in the hands of A. A is
now considering whether to elect the application of the involuntary conversion provisions
and thereby defer the gain on the death of Bluebell.
By electing the'application of involuntary conversion provisions, A will avoid an
immediate tax of $110,000 that would have been recognized on Bluebell's death, but will
have only a $40,000 basis in Snowdrop that may be recovered in the following years. If A
does not elect to defer the gain, he will owe tax in the amount of $110,000, but Snowdrop
will have a $500,000 basis. However, the after-tax benefits of the higher cost recovery de-
ductions on the higher basis will not exceed the tax immediately deferred ($110,000), and
the lower cost recovery deductions taken on the $40,000 substituted basis until the third
year. IfA decides not to defer gain and thereby receives a $500,000 basis in Snowdrop, the
total cost recovery deductions over a five-year period will be worth $250,000 in after-tax
deductions. The taxpayer must decide if the $110,000 avoided in immediate tax and
therefore continued in the investment in other thoroughbreds, is more desirable than the
future greater tax benefit of the cost recovery deductions.
10 See text accompanying note 4 supra for a brief explanation of I.R.C. § 1033.
" I.R.C. § 1033(a) (1976).
12 I.R.C. § 1033(d) (1976).
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will be recognized if it is converted into similar or related proper-
ty or if the proceeds received upon its conversion are reinvested
in similar or related property within two years after the close of
the taxable year in which any part of the gain upon conversion is
realized.3 If gain is not recognized, the newly acquired property
assumes the tax basis of the involuntarily converted property. 4
Proceeds received on an involuntary conversion that are not rein-
vested in similar or related property are taxable.15 The tax hold-
ing period of the converted property may be tacked onto that of
the newly acquired property.16
Often it is difficult to apply the rules of section 1033 to
thoroughbred horses because of the scarcity of authority regard-
ing the involuntary conversion of animals. Most of the authority
under section 1033 has developed regarding real property and
often one must draw analogies to reach a conclusion as to ani-
mals.
II. WHAT IS INVOLUNTARY CONVERSION?
Before the non-recognition provisions of section 1033 will ap-
ply, a determination must be made that property has been invol-
untarily converted. 17 In practice, the relevant determination is
whether the event that results in the payment of insurance pro-
ceeds can be considered an involuntary conversion within the
meaning of section 1033(a).
Numerous types of insurance policies are written on horses.
The events that many of the policies insure against are clearly
considered involuntary conversions, For example, proceeds col-
lected upon the theft of a horse will certainly be deemed received
upon its involuntary conversion. Likewise, when a horse dies be-
cause of accident or disease the proceeds received under a mor-
tality policy will be covered under section 1033. However, the
tax treatment of proceeds payable under other types of insurance
is not as clear.
13 I.R.C. § 1033(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
14 I.R.C. § 1033(b) (1976).
'5 I.R.C. § 1033(a).(2) (1976 & Supp. 1980).16 See I.R.C. § 1223(2) (1976).
17 For a discussion of the Code's definition of involuntary conversion see notes 10 and
11supra and accompanying text.
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A. Foal Insurance
Insurance may be obtained against loss resulting from a foal
being born dead (as a result of being aborted, stillborn) or dying
within a specified period after birth as a result of accident, illness
or disease.'8 Normally, if a pregnant mare dies, the insurance
will cover the loss of the unborn foal.
Foal insurance may be carried by a horse owner to guard, in
part, against the loss of stud fees if a foal is not born alive or dies
shortly after birth.' 9 Normally, stud fees are deductible in the
year of payment,20 and, because of the eleven-month gestation
period of horses, it is entirely possible that a stud fee may be paid
and deducted in one year and insurance proceeds collected in the
succeeding year when the foal is aborted, stillborn or dies within
the specified period after birth set forth in the insurance
policy. In such event, if the stud fee is not refundable, the ques-
tion arises whether all or a portion of the insurance proceeds may
be subject to the tax benefit rule. 21 Recently, a United States dis-
trict court held in Mager v. United States,2 that when a taxpayer
received a payment for property for which a tax loss had been
previously taken, the tax benefit rule caused the payment to be
taxable even though the amount received on condemnation was
reinvested in similar or related property within the meaning of
section 1033.21 In other words, the court determined that the tax
benefit rule overrode the non-recognition provisions of section
18 See generally K. WOOD, LAW FOR THE HoRsE BREEDER 9-7-1, at 5-1 to 5-28
(1981).
19 Some contracts for the services of a stud do not guarantee impregnation or a live
foal. Therefore, the fees are payable and non-refundable after the stud service without re-
gard to whether the mare becomes impregnated or bears a live foal. Other stud services
guarantee a live foal. These fees are payable after a mare becomes impregnated and are
refundable if the rare does not bear a live foal.
20 See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-12(a), T.D. 7198, 1972-2 C.B. 166-67 (1972).
21 This rule, applied under I.R.C. § 337 regarding non-recognition of gain on the
sale of corporate assets, requires income allocated to previously expensed property to be
recognized by a corporation on the sale of such property, despite the section's non-recogni-
tion provisions. See Cbmmissioner v. Anders, 414 F.2d 1283 (10th Cir. 1969), reo'g 48
T.C. 815 (1967). The tax benefit rule also has been applied to I.R.C. § 336. See Tennessee
Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 440 (1976), affd, 582 F.2d 378 (6th Cir.
1978).
2 499 F. Supp. 37 (M.D. Pa. 1980).
23Id. at39.
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1033. Although the opinion is somewhat deficient in relevant
analysis,2A it still is the only authority applying the tax benefit
rule to section 1033, and a taxpayer must therefore consider it
carefully.
However, to the extent that insurance proceeds collected ex-
ceed the amount of the stud fee previously deducted, there is au-
thority indicating that the excess is entitled to reinvestment with-
out taxation under section 1033. In Bishop v. United States,25
chickens were sold as part of a sale and subsequent complete li-
quidation of a corporation under section 337. Because of the in-
ventory method used to account for the chickens, a portion of
their cost had already been deducted by the corporation prior to
their sale. The portion of the sales price allocated to the chickens
in the sale exceeded.the sum of the chickens' remaining tax basis
and the amount previously deducted under the inventory
method.2s The court held that under the tax benefit rule, the
amount previously deducted must be realized in spite of the pro-
visions of section 337.27 However, the court treated the amount of
the sales price allocated to the chickens in excess of their remain-
ing basis and the amount previously deducted as being covered
by section 337 and thus not taxable at the corporate level. The
holding in Bishop, therefore, indicates that only an amount
equal to previously deducted stud fees would be subject to tax-
ation at the time of receipt of insurance proceeds even if the tax
benefit rule properly applies to section 1033. This is important
because foal insurance often exceeds the amount of the stud fee. 28
24 The court in Mager said the logic used in Commissioner v. Anders, 414 F.2d at
1283, in which the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the tax benefit rule overrode
the non-recognition provision of I.R.C. § 337, should apply to a case involving the non-
recognition provision of § 1033. However, the Mager court failed to consider the dissim-
ilar legislative purposes of the two sections-avoidance of double taxation under § 337
compared with the deferral of gain and loss as long as investment in the same type of prop-
erty continues under § 1033. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 258 (1954); H.R.
REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A106 (1954). The Tenth Circuit considered the legisla-
tive intent of § 337 to be central to its decision. However, even though the Mager court's
failure to consider the different legislative intent behind § 1033 makes its precedential
value questionable, the decision is still important because it is the only decision applying
the tax benefit rule to § 1033.
25 324 F. Supp. 1105 (M.D. Ga. 1971).
2 Id. at 1106-07.
27 Id. at 1111.
28 The amount of the foal insurance is generally determined by combining the
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B. Accident, Disease and Sickness
It is possible to insure against a horse being unable to con-
tinue racing or breeding because of accident, disease or sickness.
It also is possible to get insurance to protect against a horse being
unable to commence a breeding career due to these causes. Such
insurance is designed to cover the situation where an accident,
disease or sickness may not be so severe as to require the humane
destruction of a horse (covered by mortality insurance), but does
practically impair future racing or breeding of the horse.
A taxpayer receiving such insurance proceeds must ask whe-
ther the event causing the payment of the proceeds constitutes an
involuntary conversion. In determining whether the event mak-
ing the proceeds payable constitutes an involuntary conversion,
it is helpful to consider proceeds payable because of accidents
separately from those payable because of sickness and disease.
1. Accident
Insurance for accident, disease and sickness covers, in part,
against an accidental injury preventing a horse from either rac-
ing or breeding. The obvious question is whether accidental in-
jury not resulting in death can be considered involuntary conver-
sion for tax purposes. Section 1033(a) defines an involuntary con-
version, among other circumstances, as "destruction . . . in
part." Can an accidental injury that does not terminate the life
of a horse be considered "destruction in part"? The available au-
thority indicates yes.
In C.G. Willis, Inc. v. Commissioner,3 ° the Tax Court con-
sidered whether a ship used as a transport freighter and damaged
in a collision but repairable, had suffered "destruction in part."
After the collision, the ship owner was faced with the choice of
making major repairs and keeping the ship or making minor re-
pairs and selling the ship "as is, where is." The taxpayer, believ-
ing the ship would never be as seaworthy as it was before the col-
amount of the stud fee together with an estimate of the actual economic depreciation of
the mare for the lost breeding year.
2 I.R.C. § 1033(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
3o 41 T.C. 468 (1964).
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lision, decided to sell it. Before the ship was sold, the taxpayer
collected $100,000 in insurance proceeds which reduced the
ship's tax basis to approximately $8,000. The sale brought
$100,000 in proceeds. The issue confronting the Tax Court was
whether the sale proceeds were subject to reinvestment without
taxation under section 1033. The Tax Court ruled that the sale
proceeds were not subject to reinvestment. 3' However, in con-
sidering the issue, the Tax Court said that the repairable damage
qualified as "destruction in part" for purposes of section 1033.32
In Revenue Ruling 72-433,1 the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS or Service) applied the rules of section 1033 to the loss of
property due to a flood easement. In the facts of the ruling, the
government obtained a perpetual overflow easement that gave it
the right to flood the taxpayer's farm when necessary as part of a
flood control project. The taxpayer retained title to the land and
could continue to plant and harvest crops, but he could have no
buildings on the land. It was estimated that flooding would oc-
cur only once every six years. The taxpayer used the proceeds
from the easement to pay for other farm land.
Although the ruling did not involve the definition of "de-
struction in part," it did apply section 1033 to a situation where
the taxpayer continued to retain and use the property after col-
lecting the condemnation proceeds. In so doing the Service spe-
cifically modified a prior ruling's statement that the application
of section 1033 is "limited to a situation in which the taxpayer is
deprived of practically all his beneficial rights in property." In
other words, the Service recognized that section 1033 will apply
when damage to property is serious enough to impair its value
and use, even though the property may continue to have some
usefulness to the taxpayer.
Thus, when applied to horses, it appears reasonable to con-
clude that damage serious enough to terminate either a breeding
or racing career will be sufficient to constitute "destruction in
3' Id. at 476.
32 See id. at 474. "There was an involuntary conversion here in that there was an
'impact' destruction of the property." Id.
33 1972-2 C.B. 470.
34 Id. at 471 (modifying Revenue Ruling 54-575).
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part." 35 The holdings and the language of the various authorities
discussed so far indicate that condemnation proceeds collected by
a taxpayer may be reinvested under section 1033 without recog-
nition of gain even though the taxpayer continues to hold title to
the property and the property continues to have a residual value
to the taxpayer. As applied to the ownership of horses, the au-
thorities indicate that section 1033 should apply to insurance pro-
ceeds collected on the termination of a horse's racing career even
though the taxpayer may use the horse for breeding purposes
later. However, one must bear in mind that there is an apparent
limit to the application of section 1033 in this area.
This limit was demonstrated by the Tax Court's holding in
Willis. Although the court in Willis held that proceeds received
from the sale of a severely damaged ship were not subject to rein-
vestment under section 1033,36 it noted that "[t]he wording of the
statute makes it plain that [the statute] does not include conver-
sion or sale of property where the owner had a choice of keeping
the property, or converting it or selling it."37 Accordingly, the
court held that section 1033 will not apply to sale proceeds on the
disposition of property where the taxpayer has the option of
keeping the property and using it or selling it. Therefore, under
the Willis decision it appears that the fact that a race horse may
have future breeding value will not necessarily subject insurance
proceeds to tax under section 1033, but sale proceeds from the
later sale of the injured animal held for breeding purposes will be
taxable since section 1033 will not apply.
2. Sickness and Disease
Many thoroughbred insurance policies, as part of their usual
horse insurance package, also provide benefits if a horse is unable
to commence or continue either a racing or breeding career be-
35 See Marcalus Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 1345 (1958), affd per curiam,
sub nom Marcal Pulp & Paper, Inc. v. Commissioner, 268 F.2d 739 (3d Cir. 1959), for
another example of what is considered "partially destroyed." See also Isabelle Krome, 19
T.C.M. (P--) 50,063 (1950) for a case demonstrating how substantial the damages must
be to constitute "destruction in part."
36 See text accompanying notes 30-32 supra for a brief summary of the facts of
Willis.
37 41T.C. at 474.
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cause of disease or sickness. The statute makes it clear that the
taxpayer must show both that the horse was diseased within the
meaning of section 1033(d) and that the horse was sold or ex-
changed because of such disease.
The term "disease" as used in section 1033(d) has been de-
fined in several instances and appears to be broadly interpreted.
The IRS in Revenue Ruling 61-216s8 ruled that the disease does
not have to be of epidemic proportion to qualify as "disease" un-
der section 1033(d). Revenue Ruling 54-395,39 held that illness
from contaminated feed pellets was a "disease." A similar result
was reached in Revenue Ruling 75-381 in regard to bees killed by
pesticides. 40 On the other hand, in Revenue Ruling 59-174,41
dwarfism in cattle was not considered a disease within the mean-
ing of section 1033(d) where it developed from a dwarf gene in
the cattle. As the holdings in the above rulings indicate, the def-
inition of "disease" appears broad and would cover illness due
not only to bacteriological causes but also to chemical causes.
However, as indicated by Revenue Ruling 59-174, not every ab-
normality will be considered a "disease."
Once a taxpayer demonstrates that the proceeds of the insur-
ance are collected because of disease within the meaning of sec-
tion 1033(d), the taxpayer must sell the diseased animal and
show that the sale was a result of the disease. Treasury Regula-
tion section 1.1033(d)-l(a) states these requirements as follows:
"Livestock which are sold or exchanged because they are diseased
or have been exposed to disease, and would not otherwise have
been sold or exchanged at that particular time shall be con-
sidered sold or exchanged because of disease." 42
Applying this regulation to diseased horses can often be diffi-
cult. The difficulty arises from the fact that section 1033(d) ap-
parently was not enacted with thoroughbred horses in mind.
Rather, the statute contemplates the distress sale of livestock held
38 1961-2 C.B. 134. "Losses due to the death of livestock from disease, whether or
not of epidemic proportions, come within the provisions of section 1033(3) . . . and will
be treated as resulting from involuntary conversion under section 1231(a) ... "Id.
39 1954-2 C.B. 143, modified, Rev. Rul. 59-102, 1959-1 C.B. 200.
40 1975-2 C.B. 25, 26-27.
41 1959-1 C.B. 203.
42 Treas. Reg. § 1033(d)-1(a) (1960) (emphasis added).
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for sale as food and does not contemplate the sale of a diseased
horse with a potential residual value as a breeding animal.43 For
example, if a horse, because of disease, cannot continue racing
but could commence a breeding career is sold for that purpose, it
appears that at least one of the tests set forth in the regulations
may not be satisfied. Although the horse's racing career may be
terminated because of the disease at that particular time, it may
be difficult to prove that the horse was sold because of the dis-
ease. The regulation apparently contemplates a sale taking place
so that the diseased animal may be slaughtered and does not con-
template the sale of a diseased animal that may have a continu-
ing useful purpose.
3. Loss of Property
Even if it can be established that a horse has been involuntar-
fly converted within the meaning of section 1033, a taxpayer may
have an additional burden of showing the nature of the loss for
which the insurance proceeds are payable. Insurance policies
covering accident, disease and sickness generally are written so
that the loss of use of the animal is being insured against instead
of the loss of the animal itself. If a policy insures against loss of
use of a horse, certain problems arise. One problem occurs if the
loss of use of the horse is defined in terms of lost profits. Insur-
ance proceeds for lost profits are not subject to reinvestment
without taxation under section 1033.44 In addition, a revenue rul-
ing, discussed later, creates doubt whether proceeds payable for
loss of use of property are subject to reinvestment even if such loss
of use is not defined in terms of lost profits."
In considering the application of section 1033 to accident,
disease and sickness insurance, one must begin by reviewing the
actual terms of an insurance policy to determine the actual loss
43 The legislative history of section 1033(d) is not helpful in interpreting legislative
intent. See Conference Report accompanying H.R. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954),
reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5330.
44 Any payment for lost profits must be taxed as income under I.R.C. § 61 (1976).
See also text accompanying notes 46-60 infra for a discussion of when insurance proceeds
are considered payment for lost profit.
45 See text accompanying note 61 infra for a discussion of Revenue Ruling 74-444.
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for which the insurance is being paid. It is helpful to know that
several cases have established rules as to which insurance policy
terms are fatal to the proceeds being subject to reinvestment
without taxation under section 1033.
In Miller v. Hocking Glass Company,4 6 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit considered whether cer-
tain proceeds payable under a policy were subject to reinvest-
ment under section 203(b) (5) of the Revenue Act of 1924, a pre-
decessor of section 1033. The court concluded that they were not.
In the case, the taxpayer, a manufacturer of glass, obtained fire
insurance upon its buildings and equipment and also insurance
"for the actual loss sustained consisting of net profits on the bus-
iness" and for fixed charges and expenses, if the property was de-
stroyed because of fire. "Net profits" were defined as the tax-
payer's net profits for the prior year. A fire destroyed substantial-
ly all of the taxpayer's business, and the taxpayer used the pro-
ceeds of all insurance policies to buy new plant and equipment.
The new plant was larger than the old and the production capa-
city was substantially increased. 47
The taxpayer paid taxes on the proceeds and filed a claim for
a refund. The district court held that the insurance proceeds
were payable for the right to use and occupancy, a property
right, and the proceeds had been reinvested in similar or related
property so no gain need be recognized.48 The court of appeals
likewise held that the insurance on the property itself could be re-
invested without tax liability; however, it reversed the lower
court with regard to the proceeds paid for loss of net profits be-
cause the profits, if earned by the operation of the business,
would have been subject to tax. 41 In reaching this result the court
analyzed the insurance policy and said:
The insurers agreed to be liable for the actual loss sustained
"consisting of net profits" measured by the profits of the pre-
ceding year. The purpose expressly stated was to insure antic-
ipated earnings which might be interrupted by the destruction
46 80 F.2d 436 (6th Cir. 1935), rev'g 5 F. Supp. 355 (S.D. Ohio 1933).
4 80 F.2d at 436-37.4 8 5 F. Supp. at 358.
49 80 F.2d at 437.
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of the plant, earnings to arise out of "the business which is
thereby prevented." °
Therefore, the court in Hocking Glass clearly held that if the in-
surance policy expressly insures against lost profits the proceeds
will not be subject to reinvestment without taxation under sec-
tion 1033.
A different result was reached in Williams Furniture Corpo-
ration. 51 There, the Board of Tax Appeals held that certain insur-
ance proceeds were for loss of use and occupancy and could be
reinvested without recognition of gain under section 112(f) of the
Revenue Acts of 1934 and 1936,52 forerunners to section 1033. In
Williams the taxpayer's plant and equipment were destroyed by
fire. The taxpayer had two forms of insurance coverage-the
standard fire insurance on the buildings, stock and machinery,
and three use and occupancy insurance policies totalling
$200,000. All insurance proceeds were used to rebuild the plant
and equipment.
The taxpayer's first policy insured against loss of net profits
and certain fixed expenses. The second policy had identical pro-
visions. Both policies called for a per diem allocation of the
coverage; however, both were later amended by an endorsement
that removed the lost profits language and provided instead that
the insurance was for use and occupancy of buildings. The third
insurance policy from its inception was in the same form as the
two amended policies.m
The Board of Tax Appeals held that the policies were not for
lost profits but were "contract[s] to pay the insured a flat per
diem allowance for the loss of use and occupancy of the proper-
ty."s The Board was not bothered by the fact that two of the pol-
icies originally insured against lost profits and pointed to the fact
that no financial statements were required before damages were
paid. Williams, therefore, holds that if insurance is paid for loss
5 Id.
S' 45 B.T.A. 928 (1941).
52 Id. at 937.
5 Id. at 929-35.
54 Id. at 931-33.
MId. at 936.
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of use and not for lost profits, section 1033 will apply to allow the
insurance proceeds to be reinvested without recognition of gain.
In Shakertown Corp. v. Commissioner,-6 the Sixth Circuit,
faced with a case similar to both Hocking Glass and Williams,
held for the taxpayer. The insurance policies in Shakertown
called for a weekly per diem amount which would be decreased
by the percentage of manufacturing output the insured could
continue to maintain in spite of a fire. However, the weekly
amount also would be limited to lost profits. The court did not
find this limitation fatal to the taxpayer's position and noted that
it was contained in the separate paragraph entitled "Condi-
tions." -r The court interpreted the overall policy to be for loss of
use and not for lost profits' 8
Hocking Glass, Williams and Shakertown provide excellent
insight into what provisions in an insurance policy will incur
recognition of gain on reinvested proceeds under section 1033.
Although Shakertown demonstrates that certain lost profits pro-
visions may be included despite a-later determination that the in-
surance actually is for loss of use of property, it is clear that such
language is troublesome and should not be included in the policy
if possible. However, the actual terms of the insurance policy
may not control if certain other facts are present.
The importance of facts, other than the provisions of the in-
surance policies, was demonstrated in Marshall Foods, Inc. v.
United States.59 The court, applying the principle of tax law that
the substance of the transaction, rather than its form, determines
its nature for tax purposes, held that a policy covering loss of use
and providing for a flat per diem amount was actually for lost
profits. 60 The following items of evidence apparently impressed
the court: (1) other fire insurance was carried on the property so
the court could not understand how the policy in issue could be
for loss of use; (2) the only loss that could be insured against was
a loss of profits; (3) correspondence justifying the amount of
56 277 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1960).
57Id. at 629.
S Id. at 630.
59 393 F. Supp. 1097 (D. Minn. 1974), af'd per curiam, 75-2 U.S. TAx GAs. 9536
(8th Cir. 1975).
'0 393 F. Supp. at 1100.
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coverage referred to gross earnings only; (4) the application
forms referred to loss of profits, and (5) the taxpayer admitted
that lost profits were the basis for arriving at the amount of
coverage. Thus, the Marshall Foods case cautions that, in con-
sidering the application of section 1033 to accident, disease and
sickness insurance, one must be careful to review more than the
terms of the policies. The economic basis for the insurance, the
insurance applications and the other documents may assume
paramount importance.
The case law in this area is important in helping a taxpayer
plan. It is clear from the cases that certain policy language
should be avoided. In addition, a taxpayer must be careful not to
act in such a way as to cause an insurance policy to be construed
to be for lost profits in spite of the express language of the policy
itself. Nevertheless, in spite of all of the guidance provided in the
case law, there is now concern that proceeds from such policies
cannot escape recognition under section 1033 even if the proceeds
are deemed payable for loss of use and not for lost profits.
In Revenue Ruling 74-444,6I the IRS ruled that proceeds paid
under a "loss of use and occupancy" policy were not entitled to
treatment as long term capital gain under section 1231 because
the insurance was not for the loss of property, but instead was for
the loss of use of property.62 The ruling relied on language in
Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Transp., Inc.,o stating that use
of property was not considered section 1231 property. 4 Because
the language in the case relied on is so broad and the holding is
that of the United States Supreme Court, there is concern about
the impact of the case on other sections of the Code. If the Gil-
lette Motor holding applies to section 1033, only insurance pro-
ceeds paid for the loss of property itself would qualify for tax-free
reinvestment under section 1033. This would reverse the substan-
tial body of law holding that insurance proceeds for loss of use of
property are subject to reinvestment under section 1033.
It may be noted that there is only one case on point as to whe-
ther insurance proceeds collected for loss of use of property may
61 1974-2 C.B. 271.
62 Id. at 272.
6 364 U.S. 130 (1960), rev'g 256 F.2d 648 (5th Cir. 1959).
' 364 U.S. at 135.
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be deemed to be for lost "property" within the meaning of sec-
tion 1033. As mentioned above, the district court in Hocking
Glass ruled that loss of use was loss of property for purposes of
section 1033. The court stated:
In the first place, the right to the use and occupancy is
property, or rather a property right. Whether it is to be classi-
fied as tangible or intangible, corporeal or uncorporeal, is per-
haps not so important in this case. The conclusion that it is
property, or a property right, cannot be gainsaid, in view of
the manifest intention of the contracting parties. Without
doubt, they so considered it. The contracts insure "against all
direct loss or damage by fire ***, on the use and occupancy
of its (property)."6
Although the lower court's language is forceful, it must be re-
membered that the lower court in Hocking Glass was reversed on
other grounds. That fact, along with the fear that the language
from Gillette Motor may have broad application, creates great
uncertainty as to whether accident, disease and sickness insur-
ance which is actually for loss of use of property can be subject to
section 1033.
C. Fertility Insurance
Fertility insurance is obtained by an owner of a horse or the
owner of an interest in a horse against the horse being infertile,
regardless of cause. The policy covers a particular breeding year,
and infertility is based upon the inability of the stallion to get a
certain percentage of the mares he services in foal during the
year.61 Proceeds are payable if the horse does not meet the re-
quired percentage. If the stallion does not meet the required per-
centage of mares he services, the owner has the option of holding
onto the interest in the horse and asserting no claim or collecting
under the policy. However, if a claim is asserted, the under-
writer has the option to take title to the insured's interest in the
horse upon payments under the policy.
15 5 F. Supp. at 357.
66 The current required percentage of mares in foal is 60%.
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In analyzing whether payments under a fertility policy qual-
ify for reinvestment without recognition of gain under section
1033 of the Code, many of the considerations applicable to pay-
ments under accident, disease and sickness insurance are rel-
evant. If a horse is infertile due to accidental injury, it appears
that the proceeds payable under the fertility policy would be sub-
ject to tax-free reinvestment under section 1033. As in the case of
payment under an accident, disease and sickness policy, acci-
dental injury rendering a horse infertile would appear to qualify
as "destruction in part." 7 In addition, it would seem more diffi-
cult for the Service to characterize the payment under a fertility
insurance policy to be either for lost profits or for loss of use of
property. Under fertility policies, the underwriters actually have
the option of taking title to the horse when payments are made.
Thus, a fertility policy would seem to be more like a policy for
loss of property rather than for loss of use, and proceeds payable
under a fertility policy could more readily avoid adverse tax
treatment than proceeds from an accident, disease and sickness
policy.6
If infertility is the result of disease as that term is used in sec-
tion 1033(d),6 the proceeds would appear to qualify for reinvest-
ment without gain recognition under section 1033. However, the
animal must be sold as a result of the disease. This is not a prob-
lem if the insurance underwriter elects to take title to the horse
upon payment of the insurance proceeds. On the other hand, if
the horse is not taken by the underwriter, the necessity of selling
the horse may present practical problems. 70
67 See text accompanying notes 29-37supra for a thorough discussion of reinvestment
under I.R.C. § 1033 of accident, disease and sickness insurance proceeds received due to
injury.
ij This same observation applies where fertility insurance proceeds are payable be-
cause of sickness or disease.
69 See text accompanying notes 38-41 supra for a discussion of revenue rulings inter-
preting the term "disease' as it is found in § 1033(d). Infertility caused by a genetic defi-
ciency apparently would not qualify as a disease. See Rev. Rul. 59-174, 1959-1 C.B. 203
(dwarfism in cattle resulting from dwarf gene not considered a disease).
70 Selling a well-known stallion merely for a tax advantage may very well result in
bad publicity.
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III. WHAT IS SIMILAR OR RELATED PROPERTY?
Section 1033 requires the proceeds from converted property
to be reinvested in "other property similar or related in service or
use to the property so converted."'7 It is often difficult to deter-
mine what constitutes similar or related property in a given in-
stance. Treasury Regulations are of little use. They only define
such property by what it is not and give few examples: unim-
proved and improved real estate are not similar; the use of pro-
ceeds from conversion of real property to reduce debt on a pre-
viously purchased leasehold is not similar, and a tug boat and
barges are not similar. 72 Although the regulations are not infor-
mative, they do indicate that similar or related property is de-
fined much more narrowly than "like kind" property.73
Case law and revenue rulings have developed basic principles
for determining whether property is similar or related in use or
service. One must determine if the character of the service or use
of the property is replaced. 74 Exact duplication is not required. 75
Replacement property can be of a different size, specification or
capacity, 7 and several pieces of property may replace a larger
piece.77
In determining what is similar or related property, the owner
of the property must determine whether he or she is an investor
or an owner-user of both the converted property and the replace-
ment property. If a person holds property as an investor, the re-
placement property must be held as such for it to qualify as sim-
ilar or related property. The same is true for property the owner
holds as an owner-user. Separate legal tests are used to determine
what is similar or related property for investors and owner-users.
Thus, investors use the "same general class test," and owner-
users apply the "functional use test." 78
71 I.R.C. § 1033(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
72 Treas. Reg. § 1.1033(a)-2(c)(9) (1960).
" See Reynolds, supra note 3, for a discussion of non-recognition of "like-kind" ex-
changes.
74 See Washington Market Co. v. Commissioner, 25 B.T.A. 576 (1932).7 5 3 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 20,171 (1981).
76 Id.
77 See Wilmore S.S. Co. v. Commissioner, 78 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1935).
78 For a discussion of both tests, see text accompanying notes 82-97 infra.
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A. Investor v. Owner-User
Revenue Ruling 70-39979 provides factors to consider in
determining whether a person is an investor or owner-user of a
particular piece of property. In the ruling, a taxpayer owned a
resort hotel which was leased to and operated by another tax-
payer under a net lease agreement. The hotel was destroyed by
fire and the taxpayer used the insurance proceeds to buy a new
resort hotel. Instead of leasing the property, however, he oper-
ated it himself. In ruling that the reinvestment was not in similar
or related property, the Service noted that the net lease on the
first hotel required no management or services to be given to the
hotel guests by the lessor. The income was therefore passive. It
also noted a substantial difference in business risk between leas-
ing and operating a hotel. A lessor under a net lease has a fixed
return with none of the risks associated with economic fluctua-
tions and liability to guests, while the opposite is true for the
hotel operator. 80
These factors can aid taxpayers who are deciding whether
they are owner-users or investors. However, the factors are enu-
merated in terms of real property ownership and may be some-
what less applicable to horse ownership. The only clear situation
for a horse owner is when the owner leases a horse for a flat
rental. For example, if a broodmare is leased under a net lease
for a fixed return, the taxpayer would be an investor under the
factors set forth in Revenue Ruling 70-399. The taxpayer would
not be involved in the control or management of the horse, ex-
cept as a lessor, and would not have the financial risk associated
with the economic fluctuations of breeding the mare.
On the other hand, even under certain horse leases, it is pos-
sible to have rental payments tied to the profits of a horse. For
example, the lease on a race horse could call for payments based
upon the earnings of the horse. A leased mare could have rental
payments based upon the sale price of the mare's foals. In such
cases, the factors stated in Revenue Ruling 70-399 would not
clarify whether the taxpayer would be an investor or owner-user
because the return to the taxpayer would vary with the profit-
79 1970-2 C.B. 164.80 Id. at 165.
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ability of the use of the horse. Although valid real property leases
often have provisions calling for variable rent based upon the
economic success of the lessee, it is unclear what effect such pro-
visions would have under the rationale of Revenue Ruling 70-
399.
Characterization of an owner as an investor or an owner-user
may be especially important in regard to stallion shares. Al-
though there are incentives for a syndicator to sell stallion shares
only to users,"' a person might purchase a stallion share for in-
vestment purposes only. For example, one purchasing a share
could have the syndicate manager sell the season due that share
each year. In such a case, the taxpayer would not be using an in-
terest in the horse and would not be involved in the management
of the horse. Likewise, the share owner would not have the same
financial risk that an owner-user would have and would prob-
ably be deemed an investor. The owner of a share might be both
an investor and an owner-user (a user of the share for some years
and an investor other years). Such a change of share use would be
important because, as Revenue Ruling 70-399 emphasizes, one
who is an investor in regard to the replacement property must
have been an investor as to the converted property. In such cases,
it may be difficult for owners to determine if they are investors or
owner-users at any given time.
B. "Same General Class"v. "Functional Use" Tests
If the owner is an investor, the "same general class test" will
apply in determining whether replacement property is similar or
related to the converted property. If the owner is an owner-user
the "functional use test" will apply.
1. Same General Class Test
In Revenue Ruling 64-237,82 the IRS announced that it would
apply the "same general class" test to determine if investors had
81 Under applicable securities law a sale of a stallion share to one other than an
owner-user may result in the share being deemed a "security."
82 1964-2 C.B. 319.
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reinvested in similar or related property. The Service described
the test as follows:
In applying this test, a determination will be made as to whe-
ther the properties are of a similar service to the taxpayer, the
nature of the business risks connected with the properties, and
what such properties demand of the taxpayer in the way of
management, services and relations to his tenants .... [Tihe
Service will continue to adhere to the functional test in the case
of owner-users of propertya3
As stated by the ruling, the same general class test will focus
on the taxpayer's relationships to the property itself and the prop-
erty's actual users. The test will not focus on the actual use of the
property. In applying this test to investors in horses, attention
must be directed to the form of ownership, the legal relationship
the owner has with the users of the horse, the method of calculat-
ing the return on the owner's investment, the business risk and
any management duties of the owner in order to assure their sim-
ilarity before and after the conversion.
2. Functional Use Test
Whereas the same general class test focuses on the taxpayer's
relationship to the property and its users and ignores its actual
use, the "functional use" test concentrates on the actual physical
use of the property s4 This test considers the service or use the
property was designed to afford and the actual physical charac-
teristics of the property. 5 It has been used to hold the following
83 d. at 320. The Service gave the example of a lessor who rented out the converted
property as a light manufacturing plant and the replacement property as a wholesale gro-
cery warehouse. The court noted that "the nature of the taxpayer-owner's service or use of
the properties may be similar although that of the end users may change [in the case of in-
vestors under the 'same general class" test]." Thus, as long as both properties are rented
and are similar in the "extent and type of.. . management activities, the amount and
kind of services [to the tenants], and the nature of his business risks connected with the
properties" the converted and replacement properties satisfy the "same general class" test.
On the contrary, in the example, if the taxpayer is subject to the "functional use
test," then, according to the Service, by changing the use from a light manufacturing
plant to a wholesale grocery warehouse "he has so changed the nature of his relationship to
the property as to be outside the nonrecognition of gain provisions." Id.
8' 3J. MERTENS, supra note 75, at § 20.171.
85 Id.
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examples to be dissimilar: a car wash and a printing company; 6 a
billiard center and bowling center; 87 a mobile home park and
motel;m and a land-based seafood processing plant and a ship
used as a seafood processing plant.8 9 Conversely, the test has been
used to hold the property in the following examples to be similar
or related: two buildings replacing one building, all with the
same purpose;10 a farm with one rental residence and a farm with
one rental and one personal residence; 91 and farm land for grow-
ing crops and farm land for raising cattle and growing fruit.92
In applying the functional use test to thoroughbred horses,
those held for different purposes will not be considered to have
similar or related uses. 93 For example, a racing animal will not be
considered as similar or related property to either a breeding ani-
mal or an animal held for sale. Likewise, a breeding animal will
not be considered similar or related to animals held for sale.
Therefore, an owner-user of a thoroughbred must always replace
a converted animal with an animal held for the same purpose.
Although replacing property with property held for the same
purpose should not normally present a problem, one must bear in
mind that the ultimate purpose for which property is held will
determine its purpose under section 1033. For example, in S.H.
Kress and Co. v. Commissioner,"4 the Tax Court ruled that
where property was held for a future store building site, its ac-
tual use as a parking lot in the meantime did not render it dissim-
ilar to another store building site.9 Likewise, in William A.
Scheuber,9 the Tax Court ruled that real property improved
with shoddy and insignificant rental structures but held for fu-
ture appreciation and sale was similar property to unimproved
real estate held for sale even though the rental structures on the
86 Santucci, 42 T.C.M. (P-H) 73,178 (1973).
87 19762 C.B. 242.
18 Rev. Rul. 76-390,1976-2 C.B. 243.
89 Rev. Rul. 77-192, 1977-1 C.B. 249.
90 Cotton Concentration Co., 4 B.T.A. 121 (1926).
91 Rev. Rul. 54-569, 1954-2 C.B. 144.
92 SENATE FIN. COMM. REP. No. 1052, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
93 I.R.S. Field Release No. 121.
94 40 T.C. 142 (1963).
15 Id. at 154.
96 35 T.C.M. (P-H) 66,107 (1966).
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improved property were rented in the meantime.97
Determining the ultimate purpose for any horse may be diffi-
cult. Race horses are often purchased with an eye to eventual
conversion to a breeding career. Other race horses are purchased
by potential syndicators for the purpose of syndication and sale.
Some yearlings may be held for sale while other yearlings are
held for racing. Because of the ultimate purpose rule, a taxpayer
seeking to invoke section 1033 must be careful in establishing
both the ultimate purpose of the converted horse and the ulti-
mate purpose of the replacement horse.
C. Opposite Sex
Section 1031 governing "like kind" exchanges, contains a sta-
tutory provision that requires livestock to be of the same sex to be
eligible for non-recognition." Section 1033 does not contain such
a requirement. Nevertheless, the Service has taken the position in
a private letter ruling that breeding cattle of opposite sexes are
not similar or related property when held by owner-users." The
ruling applied the functional use test, stating:
Although bulls and cows may both be viewed as being used for
breeding purposes, the specific function of bulls and cows in
the breeding process are sufficiently dissimilar as to cause us to
view the end uses made of each sex as dissimilar. Once impreg-
nated, the role of the cow in the breeding process is essentially
a completely passive one, i.e., to carry the unborn calf over the
gestation period. On the other hand, the bull maintains an ac-
tive role in the process as it is continuously used to impregnate
other cows. Because a bull is not connected with only one ges-
tating calf during the gestation period, as in the case of the
cow, few bulls are needed in a breeding herd while many cows
are required.100
Although the rationale of the letter ruling would surely apply to
horses, one must bear in mind its specific facts.
9' Id. at 66-635.
98 I.R.C. § 1031(3) (1976). For a discussion of the non-recognition of income on like
kind exchanges, see Reynolds, supra note 3.
9 I.R.S. Letter Ruling No. 7903064 (Oct. 18, 1979).
100 Id.
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For example, if A is an investor in regard to thoroughbreds
and therefore the same general class test is applied to A's horses,
an entirely different conclusion may be reached. In such a case,
the basis of A's economic return, the legal relationship to the user
of the animal and A's control and management of the horse
would be considered. If these factors are similar in regard to the
converted horse and the replacement horse, the sex of the horses
used for breeding should not be a factor.
Likewise, if the horse is an animal that is racing or training to
race the sex of the animal would not appear to be an important
factor. Sex does not dictate a dissimilarity of the specific func-
tions of racing colts and fillies. Rather, colts and fillies are basic-
ally trained and raced in the same way, and any differences
would seem unimportant. Duplication of the converted property
is not required. However, once again the taxpayer must be aware
that the ultimate purpose for which an animal is held is the real
test. If breeding is the ultimate purpose for which a horse is held
then the sex of the animal will be important.
D. Yearlings and Weanlings
Although property held for sale cannot be considered like
kind property under section 1031,101 no such prohibition applies
under section 1033.102 Therefore, an animal held for sale may be
converted and replaced by another horse held for sale. Because
horses held for sale have the same basic functions regardless of
sex, the sex of the replacement horse should not be a factor. Diffi-
culties arise in proving the purpose for which a particular con-
verted horse is held. For example, if a taxpayer generally sells
yearlings and a particular yearling is killed, difficulty arises
when a replacement is acquired with an intent to race it. Since
horses held for sale will not be similar or related property to
horses held for racing, the taxpayer must show that the dead
101 For a discussion of property qualifying as like-kind property, see Reynolds, supra
note 3.
102 Section 1031 requires that for property to be "like-kind," it must be held for
either business or investment purposes. There is no such requirement for similar property
under § 1033.
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horse was held for the purpose of racing and not for purposes of
sale.
E. Specific Situations
1. Syndicate Shares
The owner of an insured syndicate share must determine
what type of property in which insurance proceeds must be rein-
vested to qualify under section 1033. Clearly, another stallion
share would be most like a converted stallion share. However,
one who was an owner-user of the first share must continue to be
an owner-user of the replacement share. Conversely, one who
was an investor in the first share should continue to be an inves-
"tor as to the second share. These determinations, of course, must
be made by every owner-user or investor regardless of the type of
property involved.
An additional set of pitfalls apply to certain horse syndicates.
These problems develop from the fact that a particular horse syn-
dicate may be deemed a partnership under both local law and
tax law. If a syndicate is deemed a partnership, recent case law
indicates that the election to reinvest proceeds from an involun-
tary conversion of a stallion must be made by the syndicate itself
(the partnership) and not by the shareholder (the partner).,
This requirement causes obvious problems when the insurance
proceeds have been collected by the shareholder. If the syndicate
shareholder contributes the proceeds to the partnership for its re-
investment, a question would arise as to whether the proceeds
would be deemed conversion proceeds in the hands of the syndi-
cate (partnership) since the proceeds were originally paid to the
shareholder. A strong argument could be made that the proceeds
constituted a capital contribution to the syndicate and not a pay-
ment of proceeds from an involuntary conversion.
If the shareholder tries to reinvest the proceeds alone, by the
purchase of a new syndicate share, there are additional prob-
163 See Demirjian v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1691 (1970), affd 457 F.2d 1 (3d Cir.
1972) in which condemnation proceeds received and reinvested by partners acting as indi-
viduals did not qualify for non-recognition under § 1033. Only the partnership as former
owner could take advantage of the condemned property non-recognition provisions.
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lems. In light of recent authority indicating that reinvestment
must be made by a partnership when partnership property has
been involuntarily converted, one may be forced to argue that
the shareholder's partnership interest (syndicate share) has ac-
tually been converted. Because the stallion itself will have been
actually converted and the shareholder only owns an interest in a
partnership that owns a horse, the shareholder may face prob-
lems in making this argument.0 4
In light of all these problems, it is important for it to be es-
tablished that at the time of conversion the shareholder owned
an undivided fractional interest in a thoroughbred instead of a
partnership interest. However, establishing that the syndicate is
not a partnership may be difficult. Although horse syndicates
generally elect against partnership treatment pursuant to the
provisions of section 761, there is some question of the effective-
ness of that election for purposes of making a reinvestment under
section 1033.105 In addition, many syndicates, in spite of an elec-
tion under section 761, may be deemed to be a partnership due to
invalidity of the election. An election under section 761 is valid
only if the entity is formed for one of the following purposes:
(1) for investment purposes only and not for the active con-
duct of a business, or
(2) for the joint production, extraction, or use of property, but
not for the purpose of selling services or property produced
or extracted, or
(3) by dealers in securities for a short period for the purpose of
underwriting, selling or distributing a particular issue of
securities. 106
Although use of a horse by a breeding syndicate normally
qualifies as "joint ... use of property," and the syndicate there-
104 In Harmelink & Vignes, Tax Aspects of Baseball Player Contracts and Planning
Opportunities, 59 TAXEs 543, 543-45 (1981), the authors discuss the possible application of
the involuntary conversion rules to baseball player contracts when the players die. The
authors argue that, under a destruction of the "economic unit" theory, upon the death of
the player a contract may be considered converted for purposes of § 1033. Although a con-
tract for services differs substantially from a partnership owning property, it is possible
that a shareholder could make a similar argument upon the death of a stallion owned by a
syndicate that is deemed a partnership.
105 See Whitaker, Involuntary Conversions, 33-6th TAx MCMT. A-30 (BNA) (1975).
106 I.R.C. § 761(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
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fore is eligible to elect out of partnership treatment, section 761
makes it clear that the election will not be effective if the syndi-
cate sells services or property. Often syndicate agreements call
for the sale of excess stallion seasons. If such sales are made, a sec-
tion 761 election seems invalid. The result of an invalid election is
that the syndicate will be deemed a partnership.
Finally, where it can be established that a shareholder's in-
terest constitutes an undivided fractional interest in the horse
and not a partnership interest, the shareholder must be careful
that the new stallion share that is acquired does not constitute an
interest in a partnership. An undivided interest in tangible per-
sonal property and a partnership interest will not be deemed sim-
ilar property. Therefore, a taxpayer should carefully review
the tax status of both the old syndicate and the new.
2. Proceeds Reinvested in a Thoroughbred Horse
The question sometimes arises as to whether proceeds from a
converted stallion share can be reinvested in outright purchase of
a stallion. Because no authoritative answer exists to this question,
one must approach such an investment cautiously.
Assuming all proper elections have been made, a syndicate
share will be deemed an undivided interest in tangible personal
property. The ownership of the stallion obviously will be total
ownership of tangible personal property. The fact that an owner
can increase an ownership interest from a partial interest in one
horse to a total interest in another horse does not by itself cause a
problem. The reverse situation, replacing a total interest with a
partial interest, has qualified for section 1033 treatment. In Rev-
enue Ruling 57-154,118 a taxpayer was allowed to replace total
ownership in a farm with a tenancy-in-common in a second
farm.
One dissimilarity between the use of a stallion share and the
use of a stallion may prove troublesome. An owner's use of and
relationship to a stallion may be very different from that to a stal-
lion share. One who owns a stallion has possession and complete
107 See Rev. Rul. 57-154, 1957-1 C.B. 262; Rev. Rul. 55-351, 1955-1 C.B. 343.
108 1957-1 C.B. 262.
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control of management. Certain of the stallion's seasons may be
sold to others, and the management and sales of seasons may
even constitute a business. On the other hand, a syndicate mem-
ber does not have possession of the stallion and generally has little
voice, if any, in management. The syndicate share owner basic-
ally has a right to one free season per year which may be used or
sold.
Fred Maloof v. Commissioner'9 provides guidance when
stallion syndicate share owners reinvest in their own stallions. In
Maloof, the taxpayer had been involved in importing, exporting
and contracting for the manufacturing of linens and other goods
in China in 1941. The business assets consisted largely of inven-
toy upon which he sustained losses. He received compensation
for his losses and established a manufacturing business producing
the same sort of goods. The assets of the new business included a
complete manufacturing plant in addition to inventory. The Tax
Court, applying the functional use test, ruled that only the rein-
vestment in inventory constituted similar or related property. " 0
In so ruling, the court noted specifically that the taxpayer
"replaced a business involving subcontracting most of the neces-
sary labor over which apparently he exercised little control with
one which he has an integrated and mechanized operation of his
own.""' In other words, the court found it important under the
functional use test that the property in which the taxpayer rein-
vested required more management involvement. The same situa-
tion arises if a holder of a syndicate share reinvests in a stallion.
The shareholder's duties and management responsibility will in-
crease dramatically and such an increase could cause the proper-
ty to be considered dissimilar under section 1033.
3. Mares in Foal
Difficult questions arise under section 1033 when a mare in
foal dies. Insurance coverage may dictate the applicability of the
non-recognition provision. When a mare and unborn foal are
covered by separate insurance policies, logic would dictate that
'9 65 T.C. 263 (1975).
110 Id. at 272.
II Id. at 271.
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proceeds collected under the separate policies be reinvested in
property that is similar to the property for which the insurance
proceeds are paid. Therefore, proceeds paid for the dead brood-
mare would be reinvested in another broodmare and proceeds
for the unborn foal would likewise to reinvested in property that
is similar to the dead unborn foal. However, one cannot ignore
the possible application of the rationale of Greer v. United
States"1 to section 1033. In Greer, the Sixth Circuit refused to
consider an unborn foal as property separate from its mother for
purposes of section 1231 dealing with like-kind exchanges. If the
Greer rationale applies to section 1033, a taxpayer may be re-
quired to reinvest collected insurance proceeds in another mare
in foal to be sure the reinvestment is in property that is complete-
ly similar to the converted property.
If the Greer rationale does not apply to section 1033, a rein-
vestment of the proceeds from two separate policies may cause an
additional problem. The question arises as to whether the pro-
ceeds collected under the separate policies are properly allocated
between the mare and foal in the purchase price. For example, a
taxpayer who has collected $100,000 under a policy on the mare
and $150,000 on the foal, and reinvesting the proceeds in a mare
in foal for a purchase price of $250,000, may find it difficult to
show that $100,000 of the purchase price was properly allocable
to the mare and $150,000 was properly allocable to the foal. A
misallocation would result in tax ramifications.
Because of the uncertainty that the possible application of
the Greer rationale brings to this area, it is important to note that
Revenue Ruling 59-811 indicates that for purposes of section 1033
an unborn foal should be considered as property separate from its
mare, at least when insurance proceeds are paid directly for the
converted foal. In the ruling, the taxpayer owned farm land
which had a crop growing on it. The crop was destroyed and in-
surance proceeds were collected for the destroyed crop. The rul-
ing treated the crop as property separate from the land for pur-
112 408 F.2d 631 (6th Cir. 1969). In Greer the court rejected the principle that the
holding period of a foal under I.R.C. § 1231 could commence prior to birth. For a more
detailed discussion of Greer and its relation to I.R.C. § 1231, see Reynolds, supra note 3.
13 1959-1 C.B. 202.
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poses of section 1033.11 Because a strong analogy may be made
between a growing crop and an unborn foal, this ruling should
serve as authority for treating an unborn foal and its mother as
separate property when insurance coverage is provided by sep-
arate policies.
If a mare and an unborn foal are treated as separate prop-
erty, a second question is relevant: What will be similar or re-
lated property to the unborn foal? Again, Revenue Ruling 59-8
appears helpful. In the ruling, the IRS held that the taxpayer
may reinvest insurance proceeds collected for an unharvested
crop in another unharvested crop or in a crop that had been har-
vested. The Service also ruled that the taxpayer, who was on a
cash basis, could not reinvest the proceeds by planting a new
crop. " 5 This part of the ruling was modified recently by Revenue
Ruling 81-279.1 -
This later ruling said that the cost of planting a new crop
would qualify as a reinvestment of insurance proceeds received
on the destruction of a destroyed crop under the correct circum-
stances. The correct circumstances, however, involved a farmer
who used the crop method of accounting provided under Trea-
sury Regulation section 1.162-12(a).17 Under this accounting
method, expenses of raising crops are not deducted until the crop
is sold. In other words, the expenses are capitalized and con-
sidered part of the crop. Under the ruling, if the expenses in-
curred in raising the destroyed crop had not been capitalized
they would not have been considered part of the crop, and rein-
vestment of insurance proceeds collected upon the destruction of
a crop in planting costs of a new crop would not be permissible
under section 1033.
If the analogy between unharvested crops and unborn foals is
valid, these two rulings help in determining what will be con-
sidered similar or related property to an unborn foal. If insurance
proceeds from the destruction of an unharvested crop may be re-
invested in both unharvested and harvested crops, then insur-
ance proceeds from the death of an unborn foal could be rein-
114 See id.
11 Id.
116 1981-2 C.B. 163.
17 Id.
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vested in an unborn foal or a live foal. However, if the stud fees
paid for the aborted foal had been previously deducted and not
capitalized when the mare was bred, then the proceeds of the
foal insurance could not be used to purchase additional stud fees
to impregnate another mare. In this regard, stud fees would seem
analogous to planting costs for a new crop.
In considering these issues, one should keep in mind that cer-
tain problems discussed above also apply. For example, if pro-
ceeds collected upon the death of an unborn foal are reinvested
by the purchase of a live foal, the live foal must be held for the
same ultimate purpose for which the unborn foal would have
been held. This obviously raises the problem for the taxpayer of
showing whether the ultimate purpose for the unborn foal was
sale or racing. Another problem is whether the tax benefit rule
will apply to subject a portion of insurance proceeds collected for
the unborn foal to taxes regardless of section 1033.
When the taxpayer carries insurance solely upon the mare
and does not carry foal insurance, it seems that proceeds should
be reinvested solely in another mare. Only in the most extreme
circumstances would it be possible to argue that a portion of the
proceeds paid solely on the account of the dead mare are, in fact,
allocable to the dead foal. Nevertheless, as shown by Marshall
Foods, Inc. v. United States,"' the actual terms of the insurance
policy will not necessarily control if certain facts exist. If such
facts do exist, the taxpayer would again be faced with the prob-
lem of determining what is similar property, as well as other
problems discussed earlier.
It should be noted, however, that where insurance proceeds
are payable under a single policy, the problem of allocating pro-
ceeds between mare and unborn foal on replacement is appar-
ently eliminated. In Evert Asjes,"9 the taxpayer had his nursery
property condemned. The property consisted of land, buildings
and trees. In arriving at the lump sum award, the condemning
authority considered the value of the land, buildings and trees
separately and a portion of the award was intended to reimburse
118 393 F. Supp. at 1097. For a discussion of this case, see text accompanying note 60
supra.
119 74 T.C. 1005 (1980).
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the taxpayer for the loss of each of the items of property. The tax-
payer reinvested the proceeds in land and building, but not in
trees. The IRS argued that the portion of the proceeds not rein-
vested in trees must be recognized as a gain. The court disposed
of the government's argument by noting that under local law the
trees were considered part of the land and that under the Code,
the trees would be considered part of the land or a crop. As such,
the court held that no allocation to trees or property separate
from the land was required.120 In other words, the court held that
although the trees were considered separately in making the
award, a separate reinvestment in trees is not necessary.
Other cases decided under section 1033 have similar hold-
ings. For example, in Massillon-Cleveland-Akron Sign Company
v. Commissioner,12 1 insurance proceeds were paid for buildings,
machinery and equipment destroyed by fire. The insurance com-
pany paid a total of $99,764.42 ($60,711 for buildings and
$39,053.42 for machinery and equipment destroyed). The tax-
payer reinvested $20,208.50 in replacement machinery and
equipment and $79,556.02 in buildings. The Service argued that
to the extent that part of the proceeds received for machinery
and equipment was not reinvested in machinery and equipment
but in buildings, a gain had to be recognized. The court rejected
the argument and ruled that the statute did not require specific
allocation when assets were destroyed together and the insurance
is paid in a lump sum. 2
CONCLUSION
Because of rampant economic appreciation in the thorough-
bred horse industry, the well-informed taxpayer often will want
to consider application of the non-recognition provisions upon
the disposition of a horse. Unfortunately, the lack of determina-
tive authority under section 1033 in regard to horses leaves great
uncertainty as to when a taxpayer may qualify a transaction un-
der the section. This lack of authority prevents even the most
'20 Id. at 1011.
121 15T.C. 79 (1950).
122 Id. at 83.
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well-informed taxpayer from being fully comfortable as to the
exact tax consequences of many transactions. Traps abound for
both the wary and the unwary. In taxes, as in life, horses are a
gamble.

